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To support the argument that the testator intended to insure a
full marital deduction, the dissent stated that a presumption to that
effect existed. In the absence of a state apportionment statute or of
clear contrary intent on the part of the testator, the marital estate is
presumed to be relieved of federal tax liability. The dissent based this
presumption on the decision in Estate of Amory Lawrence Haskell.4
In Haskell, the Tax Court dealt with a New Jersey transfer tax imposed on beneficiaries under a will. The Tax Court merely"alluded to
the presumption, equated the transfer tax with federal estate taxes,
and relieved the marital estate of state tax liability.
It seems that the presumption relied on by the dissent in Wycoff
is not supported strongly enough to overcome the three rules of construction discussed in the majority opinion.12 Therefore, the following
principles can be stated. The interest passing to the surviving spouse
must always be valued as of the date of death. If, at that time, the
state law provides for allocation of debts or taxes of the estate, state
law will control apportionment. Further, if the federal court is not
presented with an adjudication by the highest state court, the federal
court may independently ascertain a testator's intent, using any state
proceeding as evidence. Finally, since the Supreme Court in Jackson
v. United States13 made the amount of the marital deduction dependent upon the proper drafting of the will, no presumption in favor of
a maximum marital deduction relieved of general estate liability can
be asserted.

GIFT TAXATION

VII.

The federal gift tax, provided for under the Internal Revenue
Code, has been conceptualized, by the courts as a tax on the exercise
, 58 T.C. 197 (1972).
In Dodd v. United States, 345 F.2d 715, 718 (3d Cir. 1965), the court stated that
a spouse was a unique beneficiary because the spouse was of the same generation as
the testator. Consequently, the testator could be presumed to prefer a reduction in the
children's share of the estate. Conversely, in Thompson v. Wiseman, 233 F.2d 734 (10th
Cir. 1956), the court refused to accord the surviving spouse any special status which
would create a presumption that the testator preferred to relieve the marital share of
estate tax or debt liability. Arguably, the decision in Jackson v. United States, 376
U.S. 503 (1964), settled the controversy by placing the burden on the testator properly
to draft a will. Therefore, the three rules of construction discussed by the majority in
Wycoff aid in determining whether the testator intended to achieve the maximum
marital deduction through an analysis of the will.
43376 U.S. 503 (1964).
42

1106

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

of one power incident to ownership-the right to give one's property
to a donee. This tax was enacted by Congress as a supplement to
federal income and estate taxes, 2 although the nature and extent of
its interaction with those two taxes remain uncertain.3 Because of the
widely varying factual contexts4 courts have utilized very general
standards when considering the possible gift tax ramifications of various transactions.
Several cases decided in 1974 suggest three different areas in
which the applicability of gift tax provisions may be questioned: the
manner in which a particular gift is to be valued; the determination
of whether a certain transaction qualifies for the annual exclusion of
$3,000; and, the possible gift and income tax repercussions created
by the payment of the gift tax by the donee. The highly diverse
factual situations present in these cases suggest the potentially wide
scope of the Code's gift tax provisions.
A.

Valuation Under § 2512 of Property Donated

Section 25121 of the Code provides for the valuation of gifts so as
I See Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929). In that case, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the first federal gift tax, concluding that the tax
need not be apportioned since it was in effect an excise upon one incident of ownership.
See also Andrew H. Blass, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 622, 624 (1952).
2 See C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER, & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAXES 640
(3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as

LOWNDES

& KRAMER].

See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284 (1960).
See id. at 284-85.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2512 provides:
(a) If the gift is made in property, the value thereof at the date
of the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift.
(b) Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by
which the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing the
amount of gifts made during the calendar quarter.
Id.
Other valuation decisions handed down in 1974, all of which involve the giving
away of stock in closely held corporations, include Gallun v. Commissioner, 33 CCH
Tax. Ct. Mem. 1316 (1974) (value of stock in leather tanning company discounted
because of declining state of tanning industry); Silverman v. Commissioner, 33 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1321 (1974) (valuation of stock converted from non-voting to voting
stock); Bellenbach v. Commissioner, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1216 (1974) (valuation of
stock in holding company whose only asset was controlling interest in another corporation); Tallichet v. Commissioner, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1133 (1974) (effect of unrealistically high proposed maximum offering price of stock to public for purpose of fixing
registration fee; stock later given to donors' children).
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to ascertain the proper tax on a transaction.' While the IRS has
promulgated factors that may be legitimate elements in computing
such valuations, 7 no particular formula is mandatory. 8 Thus, disputes
may arise in any given case as to which considerations are determinative. The 1974 cases of Frank E. Zorniger and Rushton v.
Commissioner'" involved two often controverted aspects of the proper
valuation of gifts. In Zorniger,Frank E. Zorniger, Sr. owned one-third
of the stock in a car dealership corporation, Ray Bryant Chevrolet.
After the death of the other two co-owners, Zorniger, pursuant to a
buy-sell agreement, became the sole shareholder of the corporation.
Zorniger then requested permission from General Motors, with which
he had a dealership arrangement, to modify the terms of their dealer
selling agreement so as to allow his son, Frank Jr., to own part of the
corporation's stock and also to become the dealership's operating
manager. After General Motors' approval of such changes, Zorniger,
Sr., transferred to his son 860 shares of the company's stock and sold
him an additional 640 shares for $23,360. Mrs. Zorniger, Sr., agreed
to let the gift of 860 shares be treated as having been made one-half
in her name." Mr. and Mrs. Zomiger then filed federal gift tax returns and reported the 860 shares at a value of $349 per share, such
value being equal to the net book value of the stock. The Commissioner, however, gave notice of a deficiency, claiming that the per
share value should be increased to reflect an amount for the intangiSee also Sterling, Recent Developments in Gift and Estate Taxation, 51 TAXES
838, 849 (1973); Moroney, Most Courts Overvalue Closely Held Stocks, 51 TAXES 144
(1973).
6 Most of the principles underlying valuation of gifts are equally applicable in the
estate and income tax areas. Thus, cases decided in one field may have a substantial
influence upon valuation under other provisions. See LOWNDES & KRAMER, supra note
2, at 492.
7 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 237, which lists some of the factors to
be considered in the valuation of stock of closely held corporations.
1 As the Eighth Circuit stated in Hamm v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 934 (8th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964): "The valuation of closely held stock is basically a question of judgment rather than of mathematics. We feel that the taxpayers'
argument here comes down to a demand for a formula. Formulas, however, are only
tools." 325 F.2d at 940.
9 [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. (62 T.C. -,
No. 49) at 2767 (June
27, 1974).
20 498 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'g 60 T.C. 272 (1973).
See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2513, which allows married persons to treat gifts
made by either spouse to third persons as if made by both spouses jointly. Because of
her consent to allow the gift to be treated as having been made one-half by her, Mrs.
Zorniger became a party to the action.
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ble goodwill associated with the highly successful dealership.12 Similarly, the Commissioner determined that the sale of 640 shares of
stock was a "bargain sale"' 3 and that the difference per share between
$691 and $349, or $342 per share, was a taxable gift of the Zornigers.
The Tax Court held in favor of the Zornigers, ruling that goodwill
could not properly be considered as an element in the valuation of
the car dealership. While the use of goodwill in other contexts has
been allowed," the court seemed to suggest that because of the lack
of stability present in the typical car dealer-manufacturer arrangement, goodwill cannot legitimately be included in valuation. The
court reasoned that in a standardized dealer selling agreement the
contractual relationship is a personal, nonassignable one in which the
rights of the dealer are continually subject to termination upon notice
from the manufacturer. In such an event, no "reasonable person
would pay any substantial sum for good will, resting on such an
insecure and precarious foundation." 1
The rationale underlying Zomiger is seemingly applicable to any
standardized dealer-manufacturer arrangement in view of the uncertainty and one-sidedness inherent in any such contractual undertaking. Zorniger is in accord with prior decisions which denied goodwill
as an element in the valuation of automobile dealerships. 7 The IRS
has acknowledged as proper factors in valuation the nature of the
particular business and also the goodwill associated with that business.' However, the structural framework present in a car dealership
12In his notice of deficiency, the Commissioner computed the goodwill as being
worth about $342 per share, thereby raising the total value of the stock to $691 per
share. During the trial, the IRS reduced its valuation to $500 per share. [1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. (62 T.C.__, No. 49) at 2767, 2772 (June 27, 1974).
13A bargain sale, or a part sale and part gift, is a gift to the extent to which the
sale price is exceeded by the value of the transferred property. See note 5 supra. See
also notes 62-93 and accompanying text infra.
", See, e.g., White & Wells Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1931) (average earnings for each of five years preceding the valuation date used as basis for
determining goodwill); Pfleghar Hardware Specialty Co. v. Blair, 30 F.2d 614 (2d Cir.
1929) (goodwill value of manufacturing plant determined by considering with other
factors annual net income for a series of years); W.M. Ritter Lumber Co., 30 B.T.A.
231, 280-81 (1934) (goodwill included in sale of stock to coal company).
" See [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. (62 T.C. , No. 49) at 2767,
2771 (June 27, 1974), which lists the circumstances allowing General Motors to terminate its contract with a dealer.
11Id. at 2773, citingNoyes-Buick Co. v. Nichols, 14 F.2d 548, 549 (D. Mass. 1926).
'7 See, e.g., Floyd D. Akers, 6 T.C. 693 (1946); Noyes-Buick Co. v. Nichols, 14 F.2d
548, 549 (D. Mass. 1926). Cf. Rothgery v. United States 475 F.2d 591 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
" See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 237, at 237-38, which includes, among
other factors, goodwill and the nature of the business as proper elements in the valua-
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seems to preclude any allowance for goodwill, and thus mandates the
conclusion reached in Zorniger.
The Rushton case demonstrated another frequent source of dispute in the determination of the accurate valuation of a gift, the
question whether to apply the "blockage" rule. This rule recognizes
that the sale of a large block of shares relative to the number of shares
outstanding will often have a depressing effect on the market price
of the per share value of a stock."5 Thus, the value of a gift is discounted so as to reflect more fairly the realities of the market. However, blockage is not automatically utilized"; its applicability must
be demonstrated by the taxpayer through expert testimony, stock
exchange quotations, and other pertinent statistical information."'
Although the IRS traditionally opposed the blockage rule, 2 it now
tion of stock in closely held corporations both for estate and gift tax purposes.
A regulation, which is specifically addressed to the problem of valuation of stocks
and bonds where selling prices or bid and asked prices are unavailable, perhaps amplifies those economic considerations which are significant in adjudging the nature of a
business. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2 (1958) provides in part:
(f) Where selling prices or bid and asked prices are unavailable.
If ... actual sale prices and bona fide bid and asked prices are lacking, then the fair market value is to be determined by taking the
following factors into consideration: ...
(2) In the case of shares of stock, the company's net worth,
prospective earning power and dividend-paying capacity, and other
relevant factors.
Id.
Some of the "other relevant factors" referred to include the goodwill of the business, the economic outlook in the particular industry, and the position of the company
in the industry. The weight to be accorded to each factor depends upon the facts of
the individual case.
11See LOWNDES & KRAMER, supra note 2, at 531-34. Cases approving the "blockage" rule include: Champion v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1962); Maytag
v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1951); Page v. Howell, 116 F.2d 158 (5th Cir.
1940); Roth v. Wardell, 77 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1935); Henry F. DuPont, 2 T.C. 246
(1943).
21See Henry F. DuPont, 2 T.C. 246, 256 (1943).
21 See LOWNDES & KRAMER, supra note 2, at 532; Moroney, Most Courts Overvalue
Closely Held Stocks, 51 TAXES 144 (1973).
The burden will be imposed on the taxpayer to demonstrate that the government's
valuation of the gift is erroneous. The standard formulated by the court in Roth v.
Wardell, 77 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1935) is typical: "The question of valuation is so peculiarly one of fact that the decision of the Commissioner will rarely be overturned. It
cannot be overturned by the court if there is substantial evidence to support it." Id.
at 125.
2 See, e.g., Roth v. Wardell, 77 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1935); Richardson v. Helvering,
80 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
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concedes the legitimacy of the principle, 3 but it attempts to restrict
its application. In Rushton, the Commissioner's narrow interpretation of blockage prevailed over the much more expansive view espoused by the taxpayers. William and Elizabeth Rushton made sixteen gifts of common stock in an insurance company to members of
their family or to trusts established for the benefit of such family
members. The gifts occurred on four days in 1966 and 1967. Petitioners attempted to value the stock at the amount that would have been
realized from the sale of four blocks of the stock. The blocks consisted
of an aggregation of the gifts effectuated on each of the four days, or
1,422, 5,000, 6,400 and 2,000 shares. The Commissioner, however,
rejected this valuation, claiming that no such aggregation of daily
gifts was allowable. Since Rushton had furnished no information as
to the blockage impact of each individual gift, 4 the Commissioner
determined a deficiency. The Tax Court upheld the IRS's assessment, refusing to apply the aggregation concept.2
On appeal, the Rushtons argued that the IRS regulation allowing
blockage" did not expressly preclude the use of expert evaluation of
the impact upon the market resulting from the sale of the other shares
of stock comprising the remaining gifts. The taxpayers asserted that
this approach would afford a more realistic valuation and therefore
should be utilized by the Fifth Circuit to reflect more precisely the
likely price depression.
The court rejected this formula allowing aggregation, concluding
that the blockage rule could be used only in conjunction with each
individual gift without consideration of accompanying gifts made on
the same day. The court noted that the regulation permitting blockage required that the donor demonstrate that the block of stock to
be valued, with reference to each individual gift, must be so large that
2 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (1958), as amended, T.D. 7327, 39 F.R. 35355
(Oct. 1, 1974), which provides in part:
If the donor can show that the block of stock to be valued, with
reference to each separate gift, is so large in relation to the actual sales
on the existing market that it could not be liquidated in a reasonable
time without depressing the market, the price at which the block
could be sold as such outside the usual market, as through an
underwriter, may be a more accurate indication of value than market
quotations.

Id.

I'2Such information must be provided by the taxpayer in his gift tax return in
order to receive a blockage discount. Treas. Reg. § 2 5.2512-2(e) (1958), as amended,
T.D. 7327, 39 F.R. 35355 (Oct. 1, 1974).
60 T.C. 272 (1973).
25 See note 23 supra.
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its liquidation would depress the market price.? Since aggregation
was impermissible and no evidence had been shown proving the
blockage effect on each individual gift, the Commissioner's determination to all shares at the mean between the bid and asked price on
the date of the gift was affirmed.? The court concluded that the IRS
blockage regulation required valuation at the price which each donation would bring if sold under the actual circumstances present at the
time of the gift. In contrast, as the court characterized the Rushtons'
theory:
An aggregation principle, however, directly contradicts the
regulatory intent of appraisal in a realistic market for, inder
such a system, the question becomes not what would each
block have returned if sold in the market existing at the time
of valuation, but rather what would that same block have
brought in a fictitious market, one flooded by the other gifts."
The court acknowledged that daily aggregation of gifts could conceivably reflect the market more precisely but added that "that would
give us no justification for tampering with a rational, though perhaps
imperfect regulation." '3' Indeed, although federal courts have utilized
only very general guidelines in establishing the exact parameters and
nature of gifts,3 2 simultaneously they have stringently applied Code
statutes and regulations when deemed relevant.? Thus, the strict
v 498 F.2d at 92-93.
The IRS normally employs such a standard when valuating stock or bonds
where no actual sales occurred during the valuation period. See Tress. Reg. § 25.25122(c) (1958), as amended, T.D. 7327, 39 F.R. 35355 (Oct. 1, 1974).
498 F.2d at 93.
31 Cf. the language used by the court in Page v. Howell, 116 F.2d 158 (5th Cir.
1940), in which blockage was used to discount the value of stock: "Determining value
presents a question of fact. Every element that would tend to increase or diminish the
value of the gift as a whole should be considered." Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
1,498 F.2d at 94.
2 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284 (1960).
3 As the Supreme Court enunciated in United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299
(1967):
Improvements [to federal tax provisions] might be imagined. But we
do not sit as a committee of revision to perfect the administration of
the tax laws. Congress has delegated to the Commissioner, not to the
courts, the task of prescribing "all needfull rules and regulations for
the enforcement" of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a).
In this area of limitless factual variations, "it is the province of Congress and the Commissioner, not the courts, to make the appropriate
adjustments." Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 296 (1967).
Id. at 306-07.
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construction of the IRS blockage regulation by the Court in Rushton
was not surprising.
B.

PresentInterest Exclusion of § 2503(c) Extended

Section 2503(b) of the Code allows a $3,000 exclusion to be taken
from the donor's taxable gifts for any calendar quarter." However, by
the express terms of the statute, future interests in property cannot
qualify for the exclusion. The primary rationale underlying this requirement is that unless the gift is a present interest, its value is not
presently "ascertainable." 3
As previously applied, however, the present interest requisite had
an overly limiting impact upon one common taxable gift, the donor's
establishment of a trust for the benefit of a minor. Normally, the
creation of such a trust is preferable to an outright gift, both in terms
37
of resulting tax advantages36 and of more adroit use of the funds.
Yet, until the enactment of the present § 2503(c), many trusts were
held unable to claim exclusions, as the discretion given the trustee
in regard to the accumulation of income or the invasion of corpus was
38
deemed to make the trust a future interest with respect to the minor.
In effect, settlors were compelled to choose between an inflexible
trust and a trust in which the exclusion in § 2503(b) was not allowable.
The 1954 enactment of § 2503(c)39 was designed to alleviate this
3'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b).
See United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 403 (1941), citing, H.R. REP. No. 708,
72d Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1932), S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 41 (1932).
11For an analysis of the possible income, estate, and gift tax repercussions stemming both from outright gifts to minors and also to trusts for their benefit, see Sarno,
Gifts to Minors: A Part is Almost Equal to the Whole, 45 N.Y.S.B.J. 539 (1973);
Newman, Tax and SubstantiveAspects of Gifts to Minors, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 446 (1965).
" See Newman, Tax and Substantive Aspects of Gifts to Minors, 50 CORNELL L.Q.
446, 447 (1965).
" See, e.g., Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945); Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(c) provides:
(c) TRANSFER FOR THE BENEFIT OF MINOR.-No part of a gift to an
individual who has not attained the age of 21 years on the date of such
transfer shall be considered a gift of a future interest in property for
purposes of subsection (b) if the property and the income therefrom(1) may be expended by, or for the benefit of, the donee
before his attaining the age of 21 years, and
(2) will to the extent not so expended(A) pass to the donee on his attaining the age of 21 years,
and
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dilemma and also to remove the confusion" as to whether gifts in
*trustfor the benefit of minors were present interests.4' The effect of
§ 2503(c) is to permit gifts which comply with its dictates to qualify
for the § 2503(b) exclusion even though the trustee has discretion to
accumulate income for the minor and does not have to pay the income currently to the minor."
A 1974 decision, Estate of David H. Levine,43 suggests that §
2503(c) has been more successful in reducing § 2503(b)'s limitations
on annual exclusions than in its attempt to define future interests in
the federal gift tax field with greater certainty. Levine and his wife"
created five irrevocable trusts for the benefit of five grandchildren.
The provisions of each trust agreement were substantially the same.
During the minority of each grandchild trust income could be expended under the discretion of the trustee for the benefit of the
named beneficiary. To the extent not expended such accumulated
income would pass to the beneficiary at the age of twenty-one. Thereafter, the trustee was required to distribute the income on at least an
annual basis to the beneficiary for life. Additionally, the trustee was
empowered, in his absolute discretion, to make periodic payments of
trust principal to each beneficiary. The corpus of each trust was
comprised of thirty shares of common stock with each block of thirty
shares worth $3,750 at the date of the gift. The Levines claimed
$3,000 exclusions for each of the income interests transferred to the
trusts. The IRS conceded, on the basis of the decision reached in
(B) in the event the donee dies before attaining the age of
21 years, be payable to the estate of the donee or as he may
appoint under a general power of appointment as defined in
section 2514(c).
Compare Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952) with Kieckhefer
v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951). In each case, the trustees were authorized to use income for the benefit of the minor beneficiaries and to accumulate any
amount not so used. The beneficiaries, or their guardians, could request the distribution to them of such accumulated income and corpus. In neither case was a guardian
ever appointed. The Stifel court concluded that since no guardian was ever appointed,
the minor did not have an adequate present interest so as to be entitled to the annual
exclusion. The Kieckhefer court, however, allowed the exclusion, determining that the
minor did have a present interest in the income and corpus.
11For a discussion of the legislative history of § 2503(c), see Ross v. United States,
348 F.2d 577, 579-81 (5th Cir. 1965).
42 Newman, Tax and Substantive Aspects of Gifts to Minors, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 446,
455 (1965).
13 [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH TAx CT. REP. (63 T.C. -,
No. 14) at 3123 (Nov.
13, 1974).
" See note 11 supra.
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Arlean L Herr,4" that the income interest up to the age of twenty-one
qualified for the annual exclusion. The government, however, determined deficiencies, alleging that the exception in § 2503(c) providing
for a relaxation of the requirement that a gift be a present interest
was not applicable to any income interest expended during each
grandchild's majority.
In the Herr decision, the Tax Court quite broadly construed the
provisions of § 2503(c). Arlean Herr established gifts in trust under
which income was to be paid to his minor grandchildren until they
reached the age of thirty. The trustee was then directed to pay the
trust principal to them. The IRS argued that the term "property" in
§ 2503(c) was the equivalent of principal." Therefore, since the gift
of the principal was not payable until each minor reached the age of
thirty and thus was a future interest even under § 2503(c), the entire
gift should be classified as a future interest. The Tax Court, however,
concluded that "property" must be given a more liberal construction. 7 It accordingly determined that a gift in trust could be divided
into three distinct "property" interests: the income interest during a
minor's minority, the income interest during his majority, and the
principal interest. The Tax Court ruled, therefore, that the minority
income interest was a present interest within the meaning of § 2503(c)
and thereby qualified for the annual exclusion under § 2503(b).1
Utilizing the rationale of Herr,the Tax Court determined that the
majority income interest also qualified for the annual exclusion. The
court reasoned that in effect each minor had been given a lifetime
income interest." The minority and majority income interests were
35 T.C. 732 (1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1962).
46 35 T.C. at 736.
'7 From its study of the statute's legislative history, the court decided that "Congress intended the word 'property' to mean, not the corpus of a trust, but rather the
totality of elements that go to make up the entire gift that is being considered for
classification as a present interest." Id. See also Commissioner v. Thebaut, 361 F.2d
428 (5th Cir. 1966). Cf. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947).
The Supreme Court has recognized that a gift may be conceptualized as several
distinct gifts, any one of which may qualify as a present interest. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 447 (1945); Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 21
(1945). The regulations also appear to acknowledge that gifts may be separated into
present and future interests. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2 503-4(c) (1958).
The court in Herr also stated in a footnote: "Petitioners do not contend, nor could
they successfully do so, that the income for the period between the ages of 21 and 30
is a present interest." 35 T.C. at 735n.3 The Commissioner attempted to rely on this
assertion as "precedent" for its position in Levine. The Levine court, however, characterized this statement in Herr as mere dictum.
"1 [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. (63 T.C.
-, No. 14) at 3128 (Nov.
13, 1974).
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merely two components of a unitary interest which was eligible for
the § 2503(b) exclusion. The court provided two justifications for a
merger of the two income interests into one present interest. First, it
reasoned from statutory and legislative history that with its enactment of § 2503(c) Congress did not intend to obviate the possibility
of a gift of a lifetime income interest qualifying as a present interest
under § 2503(b) .50 Second, and more fundamentally, the court noted
that § 2503(c) treated a minority income interest as though it bestowed upon the minor the right to an unrestricted use, 'possession,
or enjoyment of the income. It therefore was a present interest. When
the beneficiary attained majority, this unrestricted right to the'use
of the income continued by the terms of the trust. Thus, the attainment of majority had no effect upon the beneficiary's legal rights in
the income.' Rather than disqualify the majority income interest
from the annual exclusion, the court in Levine :concluded that the
entire income interest should be characterized as a present interest.
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Raum depicted the Levine ruling as
"an impermissible extension of Arlean I. Herr which itself was an
extreme case. The result herein stretches the statute beyond the
breaking point. 51 2 First, he pointed out that the enactment of §
2503(c) was designed only to "partially relax"s the present interest
requirement in § 2503, not to effect a wholesale revamping of the law
in respect to gifts in trusts for minors. 4 Second, the dissent quite
convincingly argued that the majority had misunderstood the rationale underlying the Herr decision. In order for the court in that case
to allow the minority income interest to be treated as a present interest under § 2503(c), it necessarily was compelled to construe the term
"property" in that provision as encompassing three distinct "properties"-the minority income interest, the majority income interest,
and the principal. Only by so doing could the Herr court reject the
IRS's contention that "property" referred only to trust principal. But
by merging the two income interests into two components of a single
I* Id. The House Committee Report on § 2503 asserted that the proposal "partially
relaxe[d] the 'future interest' restriction contained in subsection (b), in the case of
gifts to minors, by providing a specific type of gift for which the exclusion [would]
be allowed." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1954). See also Ross v.
United States, 348 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1965).
No. 14) at 3128-29
"1 [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. (63 T.C. -,
(Nov. 13, 1974).
52Id. at 3129.
" See note 50 supra.
,No. 14) at 3129 (Nov.
"[1974 Transfer Binder] CCH TAx CT. REP. (63 T.C. 13, 1974).
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gift, the court in Levine effectively created a hybrid interest not
satisfying the requirements of either (b) or (c) of § 2503. Because of
the discretion given to the trustee to control the distribution and
accumulation of the trust income, such a single interest would
normally be viewed as a future interest and would therefore not qualify for the annual exclusion in § 2503(b). Nor would the exception to
this requisite provided for by § 2503(c) be triggered since not all of
the property in the trust would be expended by or for the benefit of
the 55donee, or made available to the donee upon his attaining majority.
Whether the Levine decision will have continuing vitality in the
estate planning field seems dubious. By allowing the Levines to include the majority income interests as part of their annual exclusions,
the Tax Court could be fairly criticized for extending Herr beyond its
logical boundaries. The dissent seemed justified in criticizing the
Court for allowing the Levines to receive only the benefits resulting
from a liberal interpretation of "property" without the accompanying
disadvantages. 8
Two 1974 revenue rulings, although not directly considering the
same issues presented in Levine, reemphasized the continuing uncertainties existing as to the exact scope of (b) and (c) of § 2503. In the
first ruling,57 a father in 1972 had conveyed certain real property to
his son and daughter-in-law to hold as tenants by the entirety. In his
subsequent gift tax return, the father claimed two $3,000 exclusions
for the interests of the respective spouses in the property. The IRS
conceded that the exclusion was allowable with respect to the son's
present interest in the income from the property. The Commissioner
determined, however, that it was impermissible for the taxpayer to
claim a further exclusion for the interest of the daughter-in-law in the
donated property.
In order for the gift to the daughter-in-law to be eligible for the
annual exclusion, it was incumbent upon the father to demonstrate
that her interest was a present one. This could be accomplished only
by a showing that the spouse had "[a]n unrestricted right to the
immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of property or the income
from property (such as a life estate or term certain) ... ,
See note 39 supra.
[1974 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. (63 T.C. -, No. 14) at 3130 (Nov.
13, 1974).
, Rev. Rul. 345, 1974 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 28, at 30.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b).
5,Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (1958), as amended, T.D. 7238, 37 F.R. 28727 (Dec.
29, 1972).
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Under Tennessee law, a husband owning property with his wife
as tenants by the entirety is not obligated to make an accounting of
the rents and profits to her during the existence of the tenancy."0 His
right to possession and the control of the property is immediate. Since
the wife's interest at the time of the gift was more formal than real,,
the Commissioner viewed her right of survivorship as a future interest
only. Therefore, the father could not take an exclusion for the interest
received by the wife in the transaction. By its analysis, the IRS
clearly indicated the central role that state law will play in determining whether two exclusions will be allowable in such context.
Additionally, the IRS eased its position in 1974 with regard to gifts
in trusts for minors. The Commissioner had previously taken the view
that if a beneficiary, after becoming twenty-one years of age, had to
perform some positive act in order to terminate his trust, the gift did
not qualify as a present interest under § 2503(c). 1 A 1974 ruling,"2
however, revoked this position and concluded that a gift to a minor
under a trust was a present interest if the beneficiary, upon attaining
his majority, had a right either to compel immediate distribution of
the trust corpus, or to allow the trust to continue on its own terms,
or had a right for a limited period which if not exercised would permit
the trust to be retained. Thus, as in the Levine decision, the applicability of § 2503(c) was extended.
C. Payment of Gift Tax by Donee Treated as Income to Donor
Certain transactions may have both income and gift tax ramifications. For example, an individual may incur liability for both income
and gift taxes on the transfer of property.63 One recurring source of
controversy arises from a donee's agreement to pay the gift taxes
incurred from the donor's conveyance of property." Taxpayers have
0 See In re Guardianship of Plowman, 217 Tenn. 494, 398 S.W.2d 721 (1966). See
also Mitchell v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 221 Tenn. 516, 428 S.W.2d 299 (1968).
, Rev. Rul. 218, 1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 378.
62 Rev. Rul. 43, 1974 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 4, at 13.
'3See, e.g., Galt v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 951 (1955). There, the taxpayer possessed a lease of real estate. He gave fractions
of the reserved rentals to several sons, but retained ownership of the leased property
and that portion of the annual rentals not transferred to the sons. The Seventh Circuit
held that the transfers were taxable gifts to the extent of the value of rights transferred
at that time. Additionally, the court concluded that the taxpayer was subject to income taxes for that year and subsequent years for the rentals received by the sons. Id.
' The donor may desire such an arrangement in order to effect income tax savings, or because he lacks the funds necessary to pay the tax. For a fuller discussion of
the tax repercussions resulting from such an understanding, see Rief, Donee-PaidGift
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contended, with a great degree of success,65 that they gave in effect
"net gifts" and thus are not liable for the payment of income taxes
on such transactions. The IRS, on the other hand, has argued that
the transactions were "part sales and part gifts" or "bargain sales"
in which the donor realized income from the donee's payment of his
legal obligation." Under this principle, the donor would receive income to the extent that the amount of gift tax paid exceeded the
7
donor's basis in the transferred property.
Tax: Some Considerations,58 A.B.A.J. 1325 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Rief]; Lowenstein, Federal Tax Implications of Gifts Net of Gift Tax, 50 TAXES 525 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Lowenstein]. See also LOWNDES & KRAMER, supra note 2, at 77578.
" See Estate of Kenneth W. Davis, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1363 (1971), aff'd per
curiam, 469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972) (donors paid gift taxes and were reimbursed by
donees; such reimbursements were not income taxable to donor); Victor W. Krause,
56 T.C. 1242 (1971) (only the trust income earned through date on which gift tax was
paid was income realized by donor, rather than income earned for the entire year);
Richard H. Turner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969)
(donor held to have made net gifts both to individual donees and to trusts established
for minor beneficiaries); Estate of Annette S. Morgan, 37 T.C. 981 (1962), aff'd per
curiam, 316 F.2d 238 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963) (donor did not realize
income when trustee borrowed money to pay gift tax during taxable year and used trust
income to repay loan subsequent to such taxable year). See also Pamela N.W. Lingo,
13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 436 (1954); Sarah Hellen Harrison, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952).
Under the theory of a "net gift," the amount of the gift tax paid by the donee
reduces the value of the gift for purposes of determining the federal gift tax owed on
the transaction-"both an equitable and circular concept." Lowenstein, supra note 64,
at 525. Because the taxable value of the gift hinges upon the amount of the tax, which
in turn depends upon the value of the gift, it is incumbent to use an algebraic formula
for computation of the tax owed. Rief, supra note 64, at 1325. In Rev. Rul. 232. 1971-1
CUM. BULL. 275, the IRS acknowledged the "net gift" concept and provided the formula
for making such a computation:
Tentative
Tentative Tax
Tax
= True Tax (T)
1 + Rate of Tax
Id. at 276.
Under this formula, the tentative tax is equal to the tax on the gross gift (or the
amount received by the donee prior to the payment of the gift tax), and the tax rate is
the marginal rate applicable to the bracket in which such gross gift falls. Rief, supra
note 64, at 1325-26.
" See Estate of Craig R. Sheaffer, 37 T.C. 99 (1961), aff'd, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963) (requirement in trust agreement that trustee pay gift
tax obligation in effect reserved for donor an interest in future income of trust, thus
constituting income for the donor to the extent so expended).
," Lowenstein, supra note 64, at 526.
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68
A 1974 decision by the Sixth Circuit, Johnson v. Commissioner,
appears to have rejected the concept of a net gift. In that case, the
taxpayers Joseph, David, and Clay Johnson borrowed $200,000,
$200,000, and $175,000 respectively from a bank, for which they each
signed a thirty day note with the words "without personal liability"appearing after each of their signatures. At the same time each
taxpayer transferred to the lending bank as collateral security for his
loan 50,000 shares of stock in an insurance company. The shares each
had a basis of approximately $10,000 and a fair market value in
excess of $500,000. Immediately thereafter the Johnsons established
irrevocable trusts for the benefit of their children, transferring thereto, as the corpus, their respective ownership of the stock pledged to
the bank. Each taxpayer's spouse and the lending bank were named
as co-trustees. The trustees then cancelled the Johnsons' promissory
notes with notes of their own, which were also secured by the same
stock pledged as collateral. At the conclusion of these transactions,
the Johnsons each had $200,000 in cash, and the trusts each had stock
worth over $500,000, encumbered by a $200,000 note. Each taxpayer
later paid gift taxes on the transfer of stock of $150,000, leaving him
$50,000 in cash and no personal obligation on the note. The Commissioner then notified the Johnsons of deficiencies, claiming that each
had realized long-term capital gains to the extent that the loan
proceeds exceeded the basis on the transferred shares of stock
($200,000 less $10,000).11
The Johnsons contested the IRS's determinations in the Tax
Court, contending that on the authority of Richard H. Turner,71 a,
previous Tax Court decision affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, the transfers of the stock to the trusts were in essence net gift from which
they had realized no income. 7' In that decision, the donor had made
gifts to family members and to trusts created for the benefit of minor
relatives with the prior understanding that the recipients would pay
the resultant gift taxes. The IRS conceded that the transfers in trusts
were not bargain sales but did make such a claim as to the gifts to
the individual donees. As to the latter transfers, the Commissioner
argued that the donor had realized capital gains to the extent that

495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974), affg 59 T.C. 791 (1973).
'

Id. at 1080-81.

7' 49 T.C. 356 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969).
On appeal before the Sixth Circuit, the taxpayers conceded that they had realO'
ized a capital gain equal to the difference between the loan proceeds not utilized to
pay their gift taxes less basis (or, $50,000 less $10,000). Therefore, the only deficiencies
disputed before the Sixth Circuit were those on capital gains equal to the amount of
gift taxes paid by each of the Johnsons (or, $150,000).
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the gift tax paid by the transferees exceeded the donor's basis in the
transferred stock. The government's rationale for distinguishing the
two classes of transferees was that the trustee-donees were not personally obligated to pay the gift tax whereas the individual donees
were so personally obligated.72 The Turner court rejected the government's theory, however, and concluded that:
[A] condition imposed by the transferor that the transferee
will pay the gift tax resulting therefrom does not alter the
result that the transfer constituted a gift . . . . [I]t is the
substance rather than the form of the transfers which must be
the decisive factor. It is clear that . . .Pamela [the donor]
wished to make gifts to her children and grandchildren ....
We think it clear that what was intended by Pamela was a net
gift, the value of the shares less the value of the gift tax pay73
able on the transfers.
The Tax Court in Johnson ruled that Turner was not applicable
to the case at hand. Instead, it accepted the government's contention
that the transfer was a bargain sale, or part sale and part gift. The
court determined that to the extent the fair market value of the
transferred stock exceeded each Johnson's loan it was a gift subject
to his payment of the required gift tax. Additionally, it held that to
the extent the transfers were subject to the loans they were sales and
each petitioner had realized a capital gain measured by the difference
between his loan and his basis in the stock." Therefore, each of the
Johnsons had made a gift of $300,000 ($500,000 of transferred stock
less $200,000 for each Johnson's loan). Further, each taxpayer had
realized a capital gain of $190,000 ($200,000 for each loan minus
$10,000 for the basis in the stock transferred).
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision but did not
adopt its conclusion that each of the Johnsons had effectuated bargain sales. Indeed, the analysis utilized by the circuit court in
Johnson appeared to cast doubt upon the continuing validity of
Turner and the net gift concept in the Sixth Circuit. The court characterized the part sale-part gift theory as a "semantic discussion...
irrelevant"75 to the disposition of the case. Rather than attempting
to adjudge the motives of the Johnsons so as to determine whether
72 See the cases cited in note 65 supra, all of which involved transfers of property

to trusts.
13 49 T.C. at 362-63.
7159 T.C. at 812.
11495 F.2d at 1082n.6.
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they had intended to make net gifts, the court promulgated an objective methodology.76 The substance of the transactions, in the court's
view, was that each taxpayer had given a gift of $500,000 of stock in
exchange for $200,000, of which $150,000 was employed to pay the
donor's gift taxes.77 Therefore, the taxpayers had each realized capital
gains of approximately $190,000 (the amount by which the proceeds
of each individual's loans were greater than his basis in the stock).
The Sixth Circuit offered three alternative theories in support of
its ruling, any one of which would be an independently sufficient
justification. First, the Johnsons had each received $200,000 free from
any obligation to repay that amount with property in their possession. The court viewed the amount as falling within the Code's
broadly defined concept of gross income.7 8 What the taxpayers subsequently did with such receipts was immaterial. 71 Second, since the
payment of the owed gift tax was primarily the responsibility of the
donor," the payment of such liability was a discharge of his legal
obligation by another party and thus was income taxable to him.8'
Lastly, the court reasoned that the shedding by each taxpayer of his
$200,000 debt by a transfer of the stock into the trust was a realization
of income to the extent that such obligation was eliminated, even
though he was not personally liable thereon.82

" The Tax Court in the Johnson case, as it had done in Turner and many other
decisions, attempted to assess the intent of the parties, which was thought to have
great significance in determining whether a transfer was a net gift or part sale and part
gift. 59 T.C. at 813. On that basis, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that it would be
difficult to conclude that the parties had intended a part sale, part gift, in view of its
obvious adverse tax implications. The court propounded a more objective test. "It is
better to apply the Tax Code equitably to basically similar transactions than to impose
different results depending upon a hindsight determination of 'actual intent.'" 495
F.2d at 1083n.6.
" 495 F.2d at 1082.
71 INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, § 61 provides in part:

(a) General Definition.- . . . [G]ross income means all income
from whatever source derived ....
Id.
9 As the court phrased it, "It makes no difference to what use the $200,000 was
put, whether to pay for food or to pay a gift tax." 495 F.2d at 1083.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2502. See Estate of Craig R. Sheaffer, 37 T.C. 99, 104
(1961), affd, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963); Fletcher Trust
Co., 1 T.C. 798 (1943), affd, 141 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 711 (1944).
11 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (payment of employee's income taxes by employer taxable as income to employee).
" The Sixth Circuit cited Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947) as support
for this proposition; indeed, Crane seems to constitute the core of its analysis, particularly in its rejection of the Tax Court's "intent" methodology. In Crane, the taxpayer
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Rather than overrule Turner and wholly reject the net gift doctrine, the court attempted to distinguish that decision. First, the
court asserted that the series of cases developing the theory of net
gifts involved the alleged applicability of § 677(a)"3 of the Code.
Under that provision, a tax is imposed at ordinary income rates upon
that portion of trust income used to discharge obligations of the settlor. By contrast, the controversy in Johnson centered around
claimed capital gains deficiencies.8 4 Additionally, the court noted
that one ground suggested by the Tax Court in Turner 5 for allowing
net gifts was that by using the bargain sale concept, the donee's basis,
in the event of gain realized by him on the sale of the donated property, would be increased by twice the amount of the gift tax paid. 6
The Sixth Circuit viewed this concern as unjustified and concluded
inherited real property which was then subject to a mortgage. Mrs. Crane, however,
did not assume the obligation for such mortgage. In the ensuing years, she claimed
depreciation deductions in excess of the equity build-up with respect to the mortgage.
The property was then sold for $2,500, the purchaser taking subject to the outstanding
mortgage balance. The Supreme Court ruled that "a mortgagor, not personally liable
on the debt, who sells the property subject to the mortgage and for additional consideration, realizes a benefit in the amount of the mortgage as well as the boot." Id. at 14.
Prior to the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Johnson, at least one commentator puzzled
over the failure of the IRS to press vigorously the Crane rationale as a counter to the
net gift principle. Seemingly anticipating Johnson, he viewed Crane as "sufficiently
apposite so at the very least to warrant consideration by the circuit courts .
Lowenstein, supra note 64, at 527.
8' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 677(a).
The court's statement that most of the rulings allowing net gifts involved a grantor's use of a portion of a trust was correct. See the cases cited in note 65 supra.
However, it simply is not accurate to make a similar assertion about Turner, the case
specifically relied upon by the Johnsons. There, the central point litigated was the
payment of gift taxes by individual donees. Since the IRS conceded that the transfers
in trusts were not part sales-part gifts, the applicability of § 677(a) was not challenged.
Thus, it was erroneous for the Johnson court to assert that in none of the prior cases
"did the Commissioner strongly argue, nor did the courts carefully consider, what the
Commissioner argues here-that aside from section 677 certain amounts should be
taxed." 495 F.2d at 1085.
495 F.2d at 1084-85.
49 T.C. at 363-64.
Under the part sale-part gift theory, the donee's basis for computing gain with
respect to the sale of the assets received pursuant to a net gift is the basis adjustment
for federal gift tax paid with respect to such assets plus the larger of the transferor's
basis or the amount paid by the transferee. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1015(d); Treas.
Reg. § 1.1015-4 (1960), as amended, T.D. 7207, 37 F.R. 20799 (Oct. 4, 1972).
Utilizing the net gift analysis, the donee's basis would be the gift tax paid plus
the donor's basis for such transferred assets. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1015-1(a)(1) (1960), as
amended, T.D. 7142, 36 F.R. 18952 (Sept. 24, 1971), and 1.1015-5 (1963), as amended,
T.D. 7238, 37 F.R. 28715 (Dec. 29, 1972). See also Lowenstein, supra note 64, at 528.
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that no "double credit" was involved in the instant case.87 The court
reasoned that since the $200,000 each Johnson received for making
the gifts constituted the value upon which the capital gains tax was
to be calculated, the donee's basis should be at least that amount.
The court added that the increase in the donee's basis attributable
to the donor's payment of gift taxes was "independently proper." In
essence, the increase in basis by the amount of the gift tax paid was
deemed justified since it was a cost incurred as a result of the form
in which the taxpayer made the transfer.
Although the Sixth Circuit in Johnson did not purport to overrule
Turner," the thrust of its decision was to nullify the net gift doctrine.
Its analytical approach in deemphasizing an inquiry into the intent
of the parties is likely to be more manageable, particularly with a
series of transactions as intricate as those present in Johnson. Such
an objective standard is perhaps more in accord with the methodology employed in other federal tax areas." Yet, to eliminate all possibility that a donor will be allowed to make a net gift seems unjustified, since there will be certain instances in which the donor, because
of his present tax status,9' will desie to make precisely such a gift. To
ignore completely the intentions of the parties in a transaction may
well be to ignore the realities of the parties' dealings.12 It is perhaps

noteworthy that both Turner and Johnson were decided by the Sixth
Circuit. In view of the prior judicial approbation 3 of the net gift
principle and the IRS's acknowledgment 94 of such a concept, whether
the reasoning utilized in Johnson will influence other courts also to
reject net gifts seems highly problematical.
In another 1974 decision, Davis v. United States," a federal dis" 495 F.2d at 1085.
"'Id.
0 The court limited itself to the conclusion that "Turner has no precedential value
beyond its peculiar fact situation . . . ." 495 F.2d at 1086.
" See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945). In that case in determining what was a gift for gift tax purposes, the Court rejected the traditional "donative intent" test in favor of "a much more workable external test"-whether the property was transferred for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
324 U.S. at 306. But see Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) (in deciding
whether a transfer to a donee was a "gift" to him, the court stated that the proper
criterion was one that "inquire[d] what the basic reason for [the donor's] conduct
was in fact. . . ." Id. at 286).
" See note 64 supra.
2 Cf. Richard H. Turner, 49 T.C. 356, 361 (1968).

" See note 65 supra.
"

Id.

74-1 U.S. Tax Cas.

13,000, at 84,428 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
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trict court did not consider the question of whether a net gift can be
made at all, but rather when it can be effectuated. In Davis, Mr. and
Mrs. Davis, after considering the sale of corporate stock to their three
sons, chose instead to give them such stock with the understanding
that the donees would pay any gift taxes resulting from the transfer."
Their agent, however, instead of making such a gift transfer, mistakenly sold the shares of stock to the sons in April, 1964. Having subsequently learned of the error, Mr. Davis in September of the same year
took the requisite steps to reform the transaction to indicate his intention to make gifts to his children. In 1965 the Davises paid the gift
taxes and were then reimbursed by the donees. The government
made an assessment for an income tax deficiency, contending that
the Davises' actual intent in April, 1964, was to sell the stock and
they therefore had realized income from such sale. Thereafter, any
reformation was ineffective for income tax purposes. 7
The district court rejected this contention, determining that a
donor has a very broad power to reform a transaction in order to
reflect his intentions more precisely if such reformation occurs in the
same taxable year." The court applied the "claim of right" doctrine99
I Id. at 84,429.
' In 1972, at an earlier stage of the overall litigation, the government had claimed
that the reimbursements to the parents were taxable income. It argued that the transaction was part gift and part sale. The Tax Court, however, ruled in favor of the
Davises. Estate of Kenneth W. Davis, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1363 (1971), aff'd per
curiam, 469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972). In Davis v. United States, the court rejected the
petitioners' contention that the prior decision was dispositive of the issue in controversy.
'1 Two somewhat conflicting statements in the court's opinion, however seem to
obfuscate the exact extent to which reformation can be undertaken. At one point,
Judge Brewster stated that:
the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
ground that regardlessof the intent of the taxpayers at the time of the
transfers ... in April, 1964, they could subsequently, in the same tax
year, with the consent of the transferees, and in the absence of fraud,
change the transaction to a gift and pay gift tax rather than income
tax thereon.
74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,000, at 84,428, 84,430 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (emphasis added).
At another point, however, the court seemed to restrict somewhat the ability of a
donor to make an effective reformation when it referred to:
the principle that a taxpayer who by mistake consummates a transaction in a manner that is not in accord with his actual intent may, in
the same tax year, with the consent of the other parties, reform the
transaction so as to carry out his real intent, and that such reformation will determine the federal tax consequences.
Id. (emphasis added).
"g In United States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954), the Ninth Circuit held

